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THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ITS
VIOLENT STUDENTS: HOW CAN THE LAW
PROTECT TEACHERS?
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Smith was a writing teacher at the Sumner Elementary School
in the West Lawndale neighborhood in Chicago.' She taught there
because she felt that kids from a bad neighborhood deserved the kind
of academic attention that most suburban kids received.2 On the
morning of February 7, 1997, she was leaning over a student's desk,
answering a question about the composition lesson.3 She heard
Thomas, age fourteen, call out her name from behind her.4 He said
"white bitch," raised a steel hammer in his hand, and smashed her eye
socket.5 He then yanked it out, with the claws of the hammer digging
into Mrs. Smith's cheekbones.6 He swung the hammer again, shatter-
ing Mrs. Smith's face.7
As a result of Thomas' brutal attack, Mrs. Smith now has five metal
plates in her head, and her left eye is held in place by surgical mesh
under her skin.8 At times she experiences short-term memory loss. 9
Hours before the assault, Thomas had bragged to his friends about
what he was going to do to Mrs. Smith because she had threatened to
suspend him for flashing gang signs in class.' 0 After the assault, the
state's attorney's office refused to try Thomas as an adult, and kept
Thomas' case in Juvenile Court." He was charged with aggravated
battery and aggravated assault; he would be back out on the street the
next year.12
1. John Kass, Violent Kid Ends Teacher's Dream-But He Had Help, CM. TRIB., July 22, 1997,






7. Kass, supra note 1, at 1.
8. John Kass, Kids, System Beat Teacher Long Before Her Work Was Done, CHI. TRIB., July






This tragedy could have been avoided. Three days before the as-
sault, Chicago police picked up Thomas on the street. 13 In his pocket,
Thomas had a clip of bullets.14 Although no charges were pressed, a
police report was filed; yet no one informed Mrs. Smith.15
Mrs. Smith's experience, although tragic, is far from uncommon.
Sadly, the number of such assaults on Chicago public school teachers
is growing. 16
For better or for worse, statistics reveal that the Chicago school dis-
trict is in the unique position of educating a large number of students
that it knows has the propensity to commit violent acts. For example,
in the 1993-94 school year alone, eighty-two students were arrested for
gun possession within 1,000 feet of school, yet only five were ex-
pelled.17 Additionally, during the school years 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-
93, and 1993-94, the following number of arrests took place of stu-
dents in Chicago caught with guns: 153, 168, 95, and 83, respectively.' 8
All the students were suspended, but only the following number were
expelled during those respective years: 0, 5, 5, and 5.19 During the
next three years, the following number of students were suspended:
21,810, 22,070, and 28,671, respectively.20 Of those numbers, the fol-
lowing number of students were suspended more than once: 6,738,
6,088, and 10,253.21 During those years, however, only the following
number of students were expelled: 21, 80, and 172.22
While these latter statistics show that the Chicago school district is
clamping down on repeat offenders, the number of violent acts involv-
ing assaults on teachers reveals that the school district is still too toler-
ant. In the school year 1995-96, there were 978 physical assaults on
teachers by students; in 1996-97, there were 1,198.23 This means that
13. Id.
14. Kass, supra note 8, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. City Needs an Alternative School, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 1995, § 1, at 12.
18. Chicago Bd. of Educ., Department of Safety and Security, Students and Guns, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 8.
19. Id.
20. Chicago Pub. Sch., Office of Communications, Chicago School District Report (1998) (re-
quested pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act). The statistics should be presented with a
caveat. The information provided did not present a break down for those students who may
have been suspended for violent acts such as assault. Therefore, of these numbers, some stu-
dents may have been suspended for non-violent acts, such as drug violations.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Kass, supra note 8, at 1.
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during the school years 1995-96 and 1996-97, 898 and 1,026 students
were reinstated into the school system after assaulting teachers. 24
These numbers raise troubling questions about teacher safety in the
Chicago public school system. Increasingly, teachers are being ex-
posed to students who have a propensity to commit violent acts. Yet,
the Chicago school district continues to reinstate these students into
its schools, exposing teachers to potential sources of danger without
adequate notice.25 By doing this, the Chicago school district fails to
utilize its own legal procedures currently in place which are designed
to protect teachers from student assaults.26 That failure, in turn, in-
creases the exposure to liability the Chicago school district faces
(through workers' compensation and other statutes) as a result of stu-
dent assaults.27
The primary goal of this Comment is to offer suggestions-for both
the Chicago school district and the legal system-to solve the growing
problem of teachers who are exposed to students with known propen-
sities for violence. In Part I, this Comment explains what the law is
currently doing to compensate employees injured while on the job.28
This begins with a cursory look at employees' principal means of re-
covery for work-related injury: the Illinois Workers' Occupational
Diseases Act 29 and the Workers' Compensation Act.30 It also includes
a look at circumstances through which an employer may recover in
tort from his employer when he is a victim of a third party criminal
assault. Because Chicago teachers are employed by a governmental
entity, Part I then examines the main obstacle (and its exceptions) for
plaintiffs suing a municipality: governmental immunity. Part I next
views the legal responsibility the Chicago school district has for keep-
ing students like Thomas enrolled in its schools. The section con-
cludes by examining the procedures the Chicago school district
currently has in place to protect its teachers, and the policies driving
student attendance.
24. Id.; see supra note 20. This is assuming that each separate assault was committed by a
separate student.
These numbers are not unique to Chicago. Across the country, it appears to be open season
on teachers. "Each month, approximately 5,200 teachers report being physically attacked, and
are five times as likely as students to be seriously injured by those attacks." JAMES A. RAPP ET
AL., SCHOOL CRIME AND VIOLENCE: VIcrIMs' RIGHTS 2 (1986) (citations omitted).
25. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 154-55.
27. See infra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2.
28. See infra Part I.




In Part II, this Comment suggests how the law should change to
protect Chicago's teachers.31 First, this section criticizes the courts'
indulgence of unruly students and the difficulties facing teachers at-
tempting recovery under the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases
Act for work-related psychological trauma. Part II then addresses the
two obstacles that would face teachers if they wanted to sue the school
district in tort after an assault by a student with a known propensity
for violence: the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation and
governmental immunity. Part II provides arguments as to why these
two obstacles should be overcome when a teacher suffers injury at the
hands of a student who has been reinstated into the classroom without
notification after a violent act.
Part II concludes by offering suggestions for protecting teachers
from students who have shown a propensity to commit violent acts.
First, school districts should enforce the Chicago Uniform Discipline
Code more stringently. Second, the city must develop a system of no-
tifying teachers when their students are reinstated into the school af-
ter committing violent acts. Third, courts should lighten the burden
for teachers attempting recovery under the Illinois Workers' Occupa-
tional Diseases Act for work-related psychological trauma. Finally,
courts should reexamine the policies behind the exclusivity provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act and the Tort Immunity Act and
permit teachers common law tort recovery if they are assaulted by a
student who was reinstated into the school without notification of the
student's propensity for violence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Employee Remedies: Statutory and Common Law
The logical starting point for an argument which suggests that the
courts should do more to protect teachers begins with an examination
of what remedies are currently available for teachers injured while on
the job. As an employer of teachers and other staff, school districts
are subject to liability for employee injury through three separate ave-
nues. The first two are statutory in nature: the Illinois Workers' Occu-
pational Diseases Act 32 and the Workers' Compensation Act. 33 The
third arises from common law and applies when the injury occurs
outside the scope of employment: employer liability to the employee
31. See infra Part II.
32. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 310/1; see Board of Educ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 538 N.E.2d 830 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) [hereinafter Stice].




for injury or death resulting from assault or criminal attack by a third
person.
34
1. The Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act
The Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act enables an em-
ployee to obtain relief for any disease "arising out of and in the course
of employment or which has become aggravated and rendered disa-
bling as a result of the exposure of the employment. '35 Such aggrava-
tion "shall arise out of a risk peculiar to or increased by the
employment" (i.e., not common to the general public) and such dis-
ease "shall be deemed to arise out of the employment if there is ... a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is
performed and the occupational disease."' 36 The disease does not
have to be foreseen or expected, but it must appear to have as its
origin a risk connected with the employment.37
Recovery under the Occupational Diseases Act is not limited to
physical illness, however, as revealed by Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial
Commission.38  In Pathfinder, the claimant experienced emotional
trauma after she witnessed a punch press sever a co-worker's hand at
the wrist.39 The court concluded that "an employee who... suffers a
sudden, severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place and
cause which causes psychological injury or harm has suffered an acci-
dent within the meaning of the Act, though no physical trauma or
34. See Slager v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 595 N.E.2d 1097, 1105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (up-
holding jury finding of negligence against an employer for fatal injuries a nonunion employee
received in a car accident while exiting the plant through wildcat strike picketers).
35. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 310/1(d); see Stice, 538 N.E.2d at 832.
36. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 310/1(d); see Stice, 538 N.E.2d at 832.
37. 820 ILL: COMP. STAT. 310/1(d).
38. 343 N.E.2d 913. The Pathfinder court actually presented two methods of recovery for
psychological trauma: "physical-mental" trauma and "mental-mental" trauma (the court's pres-
ent case). Id. at 917; see City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 N.E.2d 12, 14 (I11. App.
Ct. 1997). "Physical-mental" trauma occurs where the mental injuries are related to and caused
by a physical injury, while "mental-mental" trauma occurs where the mental injuries are tracea-
ble to an event. Id. Because Part I.A.2 of this Comment is concerned with employee compensa-
tion for physical injury, the focus here remains on recovery for psychological injury induced
through the "mental-mental" model. In any event, the arguments presented in Part II of this
Comment-to reduce the burdens facing teachers attempting recovery under the Illinois Work-
ers' Occupational Diseases Act-apply to recovery under either the "mental-mental" or "physi-
cal-mental" models.
39. Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 914-15. Pathfinder was decided under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, but its requirements for recovery for on-the-job mental illness are applicable to recov-
ery through the Occupational Diseases Act. See Stice, 538 N.E.2d 830; Chicago Bd. of Educ. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 523 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) [hereinafter Moore].
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injury was sustained. '' 40 Under such circumstances, a plaintiff may ob-
tain recovery under the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act
for not only physical trauma, but also psychological trauma.41
2. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
To the extent that the school district is an employer of teachers and
other personnel, the main remedy available to its staff for work-re-
lated injury is the Illinois Workers' Compensation statute.42 Under
this statute, the school district must compensate its employees who are
victims of assaults while on the job.4 3 The Chicago school district's
unique role as a municipality does nothing to limit the responsibilities
the school district has to its employees as an employer. 44
The Workers' Compensation Act is remedial in nature; it is in-
tended to provide financial protection for the injured worker as the
40. Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 917. Subsequent caselaw has confirmed the three required ele-
ments for such a recovery:
(1) the mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day
emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience; (2) the conditions
exist in reality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment conditions, when
compared with the nonemployment conditions, were the "major contributing cause" of
the mental disorder.
Runion v. Industrial Comm'n, 615 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993).
41. See Runion, 615 N.E.2d at 10; Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 917.
42. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1.
43. Id. 305/8. In order to obtain recovery, the employee must be injured in an accident which
arises out of and occurs in the course of employment. Id. 305/2; see Best Foods v. Industrial
Comm'n, 596 N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). The injury is said to arise out of employment
if there is a causal connection between the injury and the employment, see Robert B. Ulrich &
Matthew B. Schiff, Survey of Illinois Law: Workers' Compensation, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 999, 1006
(1995) (citing McField v. Lincoln Hotel, 182 N.E.2d 905 (Il1. App. Ct. 1962)), and this connection
can be established if the employee shows that the origin of the injury lies in a risk related to the
employment. Id. (citing Lubin Management Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 558 N.E.2d 189, 191 (II.
App. Ct. 1990)). Recovery is possible for assaults while on the job, for example, if the court
determines that the employee was found to be exposed to a greater risk of assault than the
general public. See, e.g., Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Industrial Comm'n, 630
N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (11. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that claimant nurse was exposed to a greater risk
of sexual assault than the general public because of doctor's testimony that nurses symbolize a
strong maternal element, making them more prone to sexual assault).
Since every jurisdiction now accepts, at the minimum, the principle that a harm is com-
pensable if its risk is increased by the employment, the clearest ground of compen-
sability in the assault category is a showing that the probability of assault was
augmented either because of the particular character of claimant's job or because of the
special liability to assault associated with the environment in which he or she must
work.
1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.11(a) (1998). This includes
those jobs that expose the employee to lawless or irresponsible members of the public. Id.
44. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1(a) ("The term 'employer' as used in this Act means: 1. The
State and each county, city, town, township, incorporated village, school district, body politic, or
municipal corporation therein.").
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costs are borne by the employer. 45 Through the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, the employee may receive an award of compensation "with-
out having to show negligence on the part of the employer, and he
need not show he was free from any contributory negligence. '46
Significantly, the employee forfeits a great deal in exchange for this
certain recovery. The employee cannot invoke common law tort rem-
edies against the employer.47 In fact, recovery under the Workers'
Compensation Act expressly precludes an employee from obtaining
any other common law or statutory remedies for a work-related in-
jury.48 Although there are exceptions to this general rule,49 only one
45. Id. 305/2. The amount of compensation awarded under workers' compensation may not
be expected to get much higher than is necessary to keep the worker from destitution. "Up to a
certain point, the amount of compensation depends upon the worker's previous earning level."
1 LARSON, supra note 43, § 2.50.
46. Pathfinder, 343 N.E.2d at 916-17. It is often said that the policy driving workers' compen-
sation is the same that drives strict liability in tort: "When a person carries on a hazardous
undertaking which has sufficient social utility to prevent the law from forbidding it altogether,
the law will permit the person to carry it on only on condition that he or she assumes liability
without fault for any consequent injuries." 1 LARSON, supra note 43, § 2.20. Put in a more
straight-forward manner:
Under workers' compensation, employees may recover for injuries without proving the
employer was at fault, and they are to be provided swift and certain recovery. In ex-
change, workers' compensation becomes the exclusive remedy because employees give
up the right to pursue a potentially larger judgment in a common law action.
Bercaw v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting Copass v.
Illinois Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
47. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5(a).
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer.., for injury
or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such em-
ployee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who
is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon
him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover
damages for such injury.
Id.
The compensation remedy is exclusive of all other remedies by the employee or his
dependents against the employer and insurance carrier for the same injury, if the injury
falls within the coverage formula of the act. If it does not, as in the case where occupa-
tional diseases were deemed omitted because not within the concept of accidental in-
jury, the compensation act does not disturb any existing remedy. However, if the injury
itself comes within the coverage formula, an action for damages is barred even
although the particular element of damage is not compensated for, as in the case of
disfigurement in some states, impotency, or pain and suffering.
6 LARSON, supra note 43, § 65.00.
48. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5(a).
49. See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. 1990).
These sections bar an employee from bringing a common law cause of action against his
or her employer unless the employee-plaintiff proves: (1) that the injury was not acci-
dental; (2) that the injury did not arise from his or her employment; (3) that the injury
was not received during the course of employment; or (4) that the injury was not com-
pensable under the Act.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:907
deserves mentioning here. The exclusive remedy does not preclude
common law actions against co-employees for intentional torts.50
The ultimate social philosophy behind this statutory compensation
system for work-related injury is two-fold. First, victims receive effi-
cient and dignified benefits for work-connected injuries which the
community would feel obliged to compensate anyway (and probably
in some less satisfactory form). 5' Second, the burden of these pay-
ments is allocated to the most appropriate source of payment, the con-
sumer of the product.52 The exclusivity of the typical workers'
compensation statute is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacri-
fices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in
balance: While the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he
is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts.53
3. Common Law Tort Recovery: Foreseeable Third Party Assaults
When the injury occurs outside of the scope of employment, the
employer may nonetheless be exposed to liability to the employee for
injury or death resulting from an assault or criminal attack by a third
person.54 Such recovery is, however, quite limited. Specifically, the
employer is liable under only three exceptions: (1) when the employer
knows there exists an unusual risk of assault and fails to warn the
employee; (2) when the employer expressly agrees to protect the em-
Id. at 1226 (citing Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 408 N.E.2d 198, 202 (Ill. 1980)). See generally
Ulrich & Schiff, supra note 43, at 1000-05. Ulrich and Schiff conclude that these exceptions to
the Workers' Compensation exclusivity rule occur: when the employer is a third party defendant
accused of willful and wanton misconduct, see id. at 1000; when the dual capacity doctrine is
invoked, see id. at 1001; when the employer's own intentional acts have caused the injury, see id.
at 1003; when the employer's battery caused the injury, see id. at 1003-04; and when the em-
ployer has committed other miscellaneous torts, see id. at 1005.
50. See Ulrich & Schiff, supra note 43, at 1005 (citing Bercaw, 630 N.E.2d at 167; Vance v.
Wentling, 619 N.E.2d 902, 905 (I11. App. Ct. 1993)). In Vance v. Wentling, the plaintiff alleged
that an injury he sustained during work was aggravated when the defendant, a nurse employed
by the plaintiff's employer, ordered him to return to work. 619 N.E.2d at 902. The court held
that an employee who commits an intentional tort "'may not raise the Act as a bar to an action
for damages by a fellow worker."' Id. at 903 (quoting Jablonski v. Multack, 380 N.E.2d 924, 928
(I11. App. Ct. 1978)); see Meerbrey, 564 N.E.2d at 1230. However, the individual who is injured
as a result of a co-employee's intentional conduct is "bound to an election of remedies upon
receiving compensation under the Act." Vance, 619 N.E.2d at 904. This prevents the plaintiff
from obtaining a double-recovery. Id. at 903-04 (following reasoning from Collier, 408 N.E.2d at
198, 203-04).
51. 1 LARSON, supra note 43, § 2.20.
52. Id.
53. 5 id. § 61.11. The key fact in establishing exclusiveness is actual coverage, not of election
to claim compensation in a particular case. The employee's right to sue the employer at common
law is barred by the existence of the compensation remedy. 6 id. § 65.14.
54. See Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Employer's Liability to Employee or Agent for Injury or
Death Resulting from Assault or Criminal Attack by Third Person, 40 A.L.R.5TH 1 (1996).
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ployee from assault by a third person; or (3) when the employer im-
pliedly agrees to protect the employee from an assault by a third
person.55
a. Special Knowledge of Danger and Failure to Warn
First, an employer may be liable to his employee for injuries result-
ing from an assault by a third person where the employer had knowl-
edge or notice of an unusual risk of assault by third persons and the
employer failed to warn the employee of that danger.56 This excep-
tion-and its limitations-is demonstrated in Petersen v. United States
Reduction Co. 57 In Petersen, the decedent was driving a truck for the
defendant company when he was shot and killed by a sniper.58 The
plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the defendant, arguing
that the defendant failed to warn the decedent that it received threats
to shoot the replacement drivers that the defendant hired to work dur-
ing the strike. 59 The jury found the defendant guilty of negligence in
failing to warn the decedent of the known threats and dangers and
awarded the plaintiff $2.25 million in damages. 60 The defendant
appealed. 61
Although the appellate court reversed the jury award of $2.25 mil-
lion in damages, it outlined the circumstances in which an employer
could be liable for the tortious acts of third parties causing injuries to
its employees.62 The court noted that ordinarily a party owes no duty
of care to protect another from the harmful or criminal acts of third
persons. 63 The court noted four exceptions, however, one of which is
when the parties are in a special relationship and the harm is foresee-
55. Id. at 13-14.
56. Id. at 26.
57. 641 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The court never addressed the role of the exclusivity
provisions of workers' compensation. This may be due to the fact that the decedent was em-
ployed by Cardinal Transport, an independent contractor hired by U.S. Reduction Co. Id. at
847. Alternatively, this may be due to the fact that the plaintiff was able to establish the em-
ployer's independent duty. Id.; see York v. Modine Mfg. Co., 442 N.E.2d 282, 283 (Il. App. Ct.
1982) (holding that plaintiff's allegations of employer's negligence in failing to maintain a safe
work environment would be barred by the Workers' Compensation Act unless the employer's
duty towards the plaintiff was established). Finally, the exclusivity provisions may not have ap-
plied because the injury was not accidental. See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564 N.E.2d
1222, 1226 (Ill. 1990).




62. Id. at 845.
63. Id. at 848.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:907
able. 64 The court observed that Restatement (Second) of Agency, sec-
tion 512(1) imposed a duty upon an employer to exercise reasonable
care to protect an employee who comes into a position of imminent
danger or serious harm that is known to the employer.65 The court
observed that if the decedent faced an "unreasonable risk of harm
known to USR [his employer], but unknown to him, USR owed a duty
to warn him of such danger. '66 Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Pe-
tersen, the court concluded that this exception did not apply to an in-
choate threat of an unidentified assailant made to an unspecified
person at an unspecified time and location.67
b. Employer's Express Agreement to Protect
The second possible exception to the general rule that an employer
is not liable to its employees for the injuries caused by the criminal
acts of third parties is when the employer expressly agrees to protect
an employee from assaults by third persons and subsequently fails to
do so. 68 This second exception is seen in Slager v. Commonwealth
Edison Co. 69 In Slager, a wrongful death action, the decedent was a
member of the pipefitters' union who was crossing the picket lines and
working at the defendant's site during a strike.70 In a hasty effort to
avoid a confrontation with the strikers while leaving work in his car,
64. Petersen, 641 N.E.2d at 848.
65. Id. at 849. The court acknowledged that section 314(A) in Restatement (Second) of Torts
does not specifically enumerate the employer-employee relationship as one of the four possible
relationships in this "special relationship" exception. Id.
66. Id. at 850.
67. Id. For a more successful attempt at recovery under this exception, see Hefele v. New
York, 267 N.Y.S.2d 946 (App. Div. 1966). In Hefele, the plaintiff, a social investigator employed
by the city, brought an action against the city for injuries sustained in an assault by a client. Id.
at 948. The day of the assault, the client was requested to attend a meeting at the department
office so that the plaintiff could meet with the client's wife at their apartment. Id. Instead of
attending the meeting, however, the client ambushed the plaintiff at her apartment. Id. The
plaintiff sued the city for failing to warn her that the client was not absent from his apartment as
planned. Id. The appellate court held that the plaintiff should be allowed to establish that her
supervisors had the opportunity to advise her of the whereabouts of the client and failed to do
so. Id. at 949.
68. Sharp, supra note 54, at 32.
69. 595 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). The decedent was employed as a quality control
inspector for a construction company that was constructing the defendant's power plant. Id. at
1098. The plaintiffs tort suit was based on the defendant's promise to provide the decedent a
safe work environment. Id. at 1101. Though the court never addressed the issue, the decedent's
status as a non-employer, along with the plaintiff's ability to show the employer's affirmative
duty, meant that the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions did not apply. Id. at 1098.
This same pattern was seen in Petersen. See supra note 57.
70. Slager, 595 N.E.2d at 1098-99.
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the decedent accelerated into the path of an oncoming truck and was
killed.71
The Slager court affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding
that the defendant's duty to the decedent arose from the defendant's
express statements, actions, and intent to provide for the safety of the
workers during the strike.72 With such a duty undertaken, the fact
that there was no history of violence in prior strikes was of limited
significance. 73 Furthermore, the court observed that the precise pat-
tern of events need not be foreseeable; but rather the risk of harm or
danger to whom the duty is owed.74 The foreseeability to the dece-
dent was indicated by the fact that the defendant called the police
earlier in the day.75 In fact, the decedent's reliance on the police for
assistance did not extinguish the defendant's own responsibility for
the safety of the decedent. 76
c. Employer's Implied Agreement to Protect
Third, an employer may be liable to its employees for the criminal
acts of third parties when the employer impliedly agrees to protect an
employee from assaults by third persons and subsequently fails to do
So. 77 This third and final exception to employer liability is illustrated
in Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Division of National Steel Corp.78 In
Vaughn, another wrongful death action, the decedent was shot to
death in a parking lot provided by the defendant. 79 The lot had no
fence, but was monitored by one security guard who patrolled all of
the defendant's numerous parking areas.80 Although there had been
previous incidents of property damage reported in the parking areas,
71. Id. at 1100.
72. Id. at 1104.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1103.
75. Id. at 1104.
76. Slager, 595 N.E.2d at 1104.
77. Sharp, supra note 54, at 36.
78. 576 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
79. Id. at 876. Though the court never addressed the issue, presumably the exclusivity provi-
sions of the Workers' Compensation Act did not apply here because the plaintiff brought the
action under the Wrongful Death Act, the elements of which include "a duty of defendant to-
ward the decedent, a breach of that duty, and pecuniary damages resulting therefrom to persons
designated by the Act." Id. at 877 (citing Old Second Nat'l Bank v. Aurora Township, 509
N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)). Unlike Petersen and Slager, however, the decedent was
clearly an employee, and the plaintiff was only required to meet the aforementioned duties
under the Wrongful Death Act. See supra notes 57, 69. If those elements of an employer's duty
cannot be met, the Workers' Compensation Act still compensates surviving spouses and children
at the death of the employee. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/7 (West 1996).
80. Vaughn, 576 N.E.2d at 876-77.
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there were no previous acts of personal violence of any kind.81 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated its duty to protect
against the criminal conduct of third persons, a duty which arose from
the voluntary undertaking by the defendant to perform its own guard
services. 82
Relying on the proposition that liability can arise from the negligent
performance of a voluntary undertaking, the court affirmed the jury
verdict for the plaintiff.83 The court reasoned that the defendant as-
sumed the duty through its company-initiated manual, which outlined
as its goal to maintain the peace and protect all employees and their
property while they were on the defendant's property.84 The court
also noted that the union's labor contract stated that it was the re-
sponsibility of the defendant's guards to protect the employees while
on the defendant's property.85 Furthermore, the court noted that
while there were other possible theories of the cause of the decedent's
death, the defendant could still be liable, as the alleged proximate
cause need not be the only cause involved. 86
81. Id. at 877. The court's reasoning here is a reminder of the importance of the foreseeability
issue. See, e.g., Petersen v. United States Reduction Co., 641 N.E.2d 845, 850 (I11. App. Ct. 1994)
(denying the plaintiff recovery, in part, because foreseeability could not be established with an
inchoate threat of an unidentified assailant made to an unspecified person at an unspecified time
and location); see also infra note 86 (discussing foreseeability problem when patrons of defend-
ant hotel sexually assaulted the plaintiff).
82. Vaughn, 576 N.E.2d at 877-78.
83. Id. at 878, 882 (citing Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ill. 1964)
and quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A, at 142 (1965)).
84. Id. at 879. The Standard Operating Procedures for the Plant Protection Department
stated as its objectives:
-To protect the property of the Company against all acts which would tend to deny
the Company the use of said property.
-To maintain the peace and protect all employees and their property while they are on
the Company's premises.
-To deny access to all persons not specifically authorized or properly invited.
-To provide a readily available, trained, and responsive force to function in
emergencies.
Id. (quotations omitted).
85. Id. at 880. The labor contract stated, under a provision entitled "Responsibility," the fol-
lowing: "'The Union recognizes that it is the responsibility of the Plant Guards to guard and
protect the employees and their property while on plant property; and to guard and protect the
plants, premises, materials, facilities and the property of the company at all times and under all
circumstances."' Id.
86. Id. at 880-81. The Vaughn decision can be a bit misleading, as many other cases failed to
find employer liability using the same argument. In Ozment v. Lance, 437 N.E.2d 930 (Il. App.
Ct. 1982), for instance, the employer was not liable for the employee's injuries that allegedly
resulted from the employer's failure to provide a safe place to work. Id. at 936. In Ozment, a
minor busboy filed suit to recover against his employer after he was sexually assaulted by two
male patrons of the motel for which he worked. Id. at 932. In affirming a summary judgment for
the employer, the Ozment court recognized that the special relation of employer-employee could
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B. The Chicago School District's Conditional Immunity Through
the Tort Immunity Act
As shown, an employee may receive compensation for on-the-job
injury through both statutory provisions and the common law. An
employee's ability to achieve the latter remedy, however, is limited
not only by the aforementioned narrow categories of foreseeable third
party assaults, but also by the requirement that the employer is a pri-
vate entity. Because the Chicago school district is a public entity, this
Comment now turns to the principles of governmental immunity.
Under the doctrine of the sovereign immunity of the state, the the-
ory that "the King can do no wrong," a governmental unit was im-
mune from tort liability.87 In Illinois, however, this general rule was
abolished in 1959, with Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District
No. 302.88 As a result of Molitor, the Illinois General Assembly en-
acted the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act ("Tort Immunity Act"). 89 Although the Tort Immunity
Act adopted the general principle that local governmental units are
liable in tort, it "limited this [principle] with an extensive list of immu-
nities based on specific government functions." 90
As a governmental unit, a school district can claim immunity under
at least four separate sections of the Tort Immunity Act. Specifically,
§ 2-103 immunizes the school district from liability for injury resulting
from the failure to enforce any law.91 Second, § 2-104 immunizes the
school district from liability for injury resulting from the issuance., de-
nial, suspension or revocation of permits, licenses, and other docu-
ments. 92 Third, § 2-109 immunizes the school district from liability for
impose a duty of care to protect an employee against the criminal activity of others, provided
that the criminal act be reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 934 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 302B cmt. e B, 214A, 314B). In this case, however, there was nothing in the record to
put the defendant employer on notice that the guests who assaulted the plaintiff presented a
special risk or danger to the plaintiff in delivering a room service order. Id. at 935.
To avoid the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions, the plaintiff argued that because
his injuries occurred outside the scope of employment (they occurred while he was illegally serv-
ing liquor as a minor), the exclusivity rules did not apply. Id. at 932. But the trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy
was under workers' compensation. Id. The appellate court declined to address the issue, and
instead ruled on the merits of the case. Id. at 933.
87. See Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Ill. 1990).
88. 163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (Ill. 1959).
89. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 (West 1996); see Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 658.
90. Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 658; see, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-103 (providing immunity
for injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or failing to enforce the law).
91. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-103 ("A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by
adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law.").
92. Id. 10/2-104.
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"injury resulting from an act or omission of [an] employee where the
employee is not liable."' 93 Finally, § 2-201 immunizes the school dis-
trict from liability for injuries resulting from exercise of discretionary
authority.94 These four respective immunities, however, are subject to
at least two exceptions: the "special duty" exception 95 and violation of
a statutorily imposed duty exception. 96
1. The "Special Duty" Exception
The "special duty" exception is described in detail in Thames v.
Board of Education.97 In Thames, the plaintiff instituted an action
against the Chicago Board of Education on behalf of her minor
daughter, who sustained injuries when a handgun concealed in the
book bag of a fellow high school student accidently discharged. 98 The
plaintiff alleged that the Board of Education failed to install metal
detectors, or to adopt other means of weapons interdiction, despite
knowledge that guns and other weapons had been brought into some
of the Board's schools, including her daughter's school.99 The court
granted the Board of Education's motion to dismiss, concluding that
the Board of Education owed the plaintiff's daughter no "special
duty" to protect the student from a gunshot. 1°°
The "special duty" doctrine is invoked if circumstances arise
whereby care or custody is exercised over a specific individual by a
A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization where the entity or
its employee is authorized by enactment to determine whether or not such authoriza-
tion should be issued, denied, suspended or revoked.
Id.
93. Id. 10/2-109.
94. Id. 10/2-201 ("Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a
position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an
injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such
discretion even though abused."). This statutory provision immunizes a municipality from will-
ful and wanton misconduct as well. See In re Chicago Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill.
1997).
95. See, e.g., Mueller v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 665 (Il1. App. Ct.
1997) (arguing that a special relationship arose between the school district and the plaintiff stu-
dent because Robinson, the defendant who sexually assaulted the student, was an employee of
the defendant who drove for plaintiffs after-school activity).
96. See, e.g., id. at 666 (arguing that school district failed to follow statutory duty to conduct a
criminal background check of employees pursuant to 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-18.5(d) (West
Supp. 1996)).
97. 645 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 452.
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municipality or public official so that a duty to act on behalf of that
individual comes into existence. 1 1 The affirmative exercise of care or
custody over the individual elevates that person's status beyond that
of a member of the public at large.10 2
The "special duty" exception has four elements. 10 3 First, the munic-
ipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to
which the plaintiff is exposed. 0 4 Second, there must be allegations of
specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipality. 0 5 Third, the
specific acts or omissions must be either affirmative or willful in na-
ture. 10 6 Finally, "the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the
direct and immediate control of employees or, agents of the
municipality.' 0 7
101. Id. at 448 (citing Fryman v. JMK/Skewer, Inc., 484 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
102. Id. (citing Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 565 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 1990)). Put an-
other way, the municipality's undertaking transforms the general citizen into an object of special
concern. Id. (citing Santy v. Bresee, 473 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)).
103. Thames, 645 N.E.2d at 448 (finding all four elements in Bell v. Village of Midlothian, 414
N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
104. Id. at 448-49. This element requires knowledge of a particular danger to a particular
plaintiff. Id. at 449. The requirement is not satisfied with an allegation that a public employee
had superior knowledge and experience and that the public employee was in a better position
than the public to prevent the potential harm. Id. The Thames court concluded that the cases
interpreting the unique awareness element provided a narrow interpretation of that require-
ment. Id. at 450. Specifically, the court stated that for a plaintiff to meet the requirement suc-
cessfully, "facts must be alleged that the defendant had actual knowledge of a particular risk to
the particular plaintiff." Id. The court concluded that because the plaintiff failed to allege facts
showing that the Board had specific knowledge that the particular student who had the gun had
brought it to school on the date of the shooting, the plaintiff failed to establish the unique aware-
ness element. Id.
105. Id. at 449.
106. Id.
107. Id. This fourth element of the "special duty" exception requires the plaintiff to show that
she was under the control of the municipality when the injury occurred. Id. at 450. This is a high
standard:
[T]he public employee creates a position of peril ultimately injurious to a plaintiff, as
opposed to situations where a plaintiff merely seeks protection from the public em-
ployee that is not normally provided. We interpret this to mean that the control ele-
ment arises when the public employee initiates the circumstances which create the
dangerous situation.
Id. (quoting Burdinie, 565 N.E.2d at 667) (emphasis added).
The determinative factor here is whether the public official or public entity was responsible for
the occurrence which gave rise to the need for protection. Id. at 451. In the Thames decision,
for instance, the court concluded that the plaintiff's argument-that the Board exercised control
over her because her presence in school was required by law-failed to satisfy the control ele-
ment because it did not establish a special duty for a specific individual. Id. The Thames court
explained, "[a] pivotal factor in the control analysis is whether the public entity or its employees
were responsible for the occurrence which gave rise to the need for protection." Id. at 452. The
court concluded that the Board of Education did not create the dangerous situation; rather, that
situation was created by the student bringing the handgun to school. Id.
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2. "Failure to Comply with a Statute" Exception
Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54108 reveals
that the "special duty" exception is not the only method of penetrat-
ing the Tort Immunity Act and making school districts liable in tort.10 9
In Mueller, the student plaintiff filed suit against the school district
after Robinson, the school's wrestling coach, sexually assaulted the
student. 1 0 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant vio-
lated four distinct duties, the first of which was the duty imposed by
the Illinois School Code to conduct a background check on
Robinson."'
In Mueller, the defendant's failure to conduct the background check
on Robinson pursuant to statute destroyed the immunity it would
have had under two separate provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. 112
In regards to the first count, the Mueller court concluded that because
this count was concerned with compliance with the law, it was not
subject to § 2-103 of the Tort Immunity Act, which granted govern-
mental entities immunity for the failure to enforce any law. 113 Addi-
tionally, the defendant's failure to comply with the statute "fettered"
the immunity it would have enjoyed under a separate provision of the
Tort Immunity Act-immunity from liability for injuries resulting
from the exercise of discretionary authority." 4
108. 678 N.E.2d 660 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
109. Id. at 666-67.
110. Id. at 662.
111. Id. at 663; see 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-18.5(d) (West Supp. 1996) ("The board of edu-
cation shall not knowingly employ a person for whom a criminal background investigation has
not been initiated."). The plaintiff's other three counts alleged that the defendant owed the
plaintiff the duty of reasonable care in the hiring and investigation of Robinson; the defendant
owed the plaintiff the duty of reasonable care and caution in the supervision of Robinson; and
the defendant owed the plaintiff the nondelegable duty to refrain from causing injury to the
plaintiff. Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 663.
112. Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666.
113. Id. (citing Filipetto v. Village of Wilmette, 627 N.E.2d 60, 66 (11. App. Ct. 1993)); see 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-103 (West 1996). The court explained:
This case is not concerned with enforcement of a law, but, rather, the violation of a
state statute. The plaintiff is not suing the state for failing to make sure the School
District abided by its statute (enforcement); the plaintiff is suing School District 54
because it violated a state statute intended to protect persons such as herself from the
type of injury she received.
Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666.
114. Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666; see 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-201. The court explained:
Finally, section 2-201 gives governmental entities immunity from liability for injuries
resulting from exercise of discretionary authority. Here the School District's discretion
is fettered by the criminal-background-check statute. The statute provides that the
School District "shall not knowingly employ a person for whom a criminal background
investigation has not been initiated." Given the statute's mandatory language, we find
that it requires the School District to at least commence an investigation of employ-
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Fortunately for the plaintiff in Mueller, the court's analysis enabled
the plaintiff to prevail on the first count.115 The court held that the
first count should not have been dismissed and remanded the judg-
ment to the trial court.116
C. The Chicago School District's Conditional Immunity Through
the School Code
Besides the possible immunity a school district may enjoy through
the Tort Immunity Act as a municipality, the Illinois School Code pro-
vides a degree of immunity as well.117 While the School Code pro-
vides immunity from suits arising out of the negligent acts of teachers,
it does not provide immunity when a school district's liability arises
out of a condition separate from the acts of a teacher or other
employee. 118
Sidwell v. Griggsville Community School Unit School District No.
4119 describes the means through which a school district may be vul-
nerable to tort liability despite the Illinois School Code's provisions.
In Sidwell, the plaintiff brought an action against the school district on
behalf of her minor son after he was injured on the playground of the
school he was attending. 120 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that her
son's injury occurred when he fell in a rut on the playground-a rut
ment applicants before it is vested with the discretionary authority to hire. We there-
fore conclude that the School District's failure to comply with the statutorily imposed
condition precedent vitiates any immunity it might otherwise have enjoyed under sec-
tion 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act for hiring Robinson.
Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666 (citation omitted).
115. Muller, 678 N.E.2d at 667.
116. Id.; see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-615 (West 1996).
117. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.20 (West 1996).
To indemnify and protect school districts, members of school boards, employees, volun-
teer personnel authorized in Sections 10-22.34, 10-23.4a and 10-22.34b of this Code and
student teachers against civil rights damage claims and suits, constitutional rights dam-
age claims and suits and death and bodily injury and property damage claims and suits,
including defense thereof, when damages are sought for negligent or wrongful acts al-
leged to have been committed in the scope of employment or under the direction of the
board. Such indemnification and protection shall extend to persons who were members
of school boards, employees of school boards, authorized volunteer personnel or stu-
dent teachers at the time of the incident from which a claim arises. No agent may be
afforded indemnification or protection unless he was a member of a school board, an
employee of a board, an authorized volunteer or a student teacher at the time of the
incident from which the claim arises.
Id.
118. See id.; Sidwell v. Griggsville Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 588 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill.
1992); Jastram v. Lake Villa Sch. Dist. 41, 549 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
119. 588 N.E.2d 1185.
120. Id. at 1186.
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which the defendant knew about for months and should have
repaired.121
The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that § 24-24 of the School
Code, which granted immunity to teachers for claims based on ordi-
nary negligence, applied to school districts as well. 122 With the plain-
tiff arguing that the school district itself was negligent and not its
employees, the issue became "whether a school district benefits from
section 24-24 immunity when a complaint alleges a claim which is
based on the negligence of the school district itself, and not based on
the negligence of a teacher.' 23 The court concluded that § 24-24 pro-
vides immunity for teachers and other certified educational employ-
ees, but not for school districts. 24 Although the school district could
benefit vicariously from a teacher's immunity when the cause of ac-
tion is predicated on the negligence of a teacher,125 the court con-
cluded that when a complaint alleges the independent negligence of
the school district rather than liability through the acts of a teacher,
the school district is not entitled to vicarious immunity. 126
D. Compulsory School Attendance
As shown, a school district is subject to liability for injuries to non-
employees (e.g., students) through exceptions in the Tort Immunity
Act 27 and the Illinois School Code.128 Additionally, a school district
is subject to liability for injuries to its employees: for injuries occurring
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1187 (current provision at 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.20).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1188. The court explained:
We believe that sections 24-24 and 34-84a provide immunity to "teachers and other
certificated educational employees," not to school districts. The language of the statute
is clear: "Teachers and other certificated educational employees ... stand in the rela-
tion of parents and guardians to the pupils." The statutes say nothing about school
districts.
Id. (citation omitted).
125. Sidwell, 588 N.E.2d at 1188 (citing Jastram v. Lake Villa Sch. Dist. 41, 549 N.E.2d 9, 12
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).
126. Id. In these situations, however, the plaintiff is the student-not the teacher/employer-
who is able to recover in tort for the independent negligence of the school district. See id. at
1186. Naturally, a teacher's recovery in tort for the independent negligence of the school district
would have the recovery precluded by the workers' compensation statutes. See 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 305/5(a) (West 1996); see also supra Part I.A.2 (discussing how the workers' compensation
statutes preclude an employee's recovery).
127. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2. Two principal means through which a school district may be
exposed to liability despite the Tort Immunity Act are through the "special duty" and the "failure
to comply with a statute" exceptions.
128. See supra Part I.C. The Illinois School Code fails to immunize a school district for its
independent negligent acts outside of those negligent acts of its teachers and other employees.
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while on the job,129 or for foreseeable, tortious acts by third parties
independent of employment. 130 All of these provisions should compel
a school district to take steps to protect its teachers from assaults by
students. When confronted with a student with a known propensity
for violence, perhaps a school district's safest solution would be the
immediate expulsion of the student. A school district confronted with
such a student, however, cannot simply deny the student an education
at will.' 3 '
The Illinois School Code compels children under the age of eight-
een to attend school. 132 The compulsory attendance rule is subject to
a number of exceptions, but none of these permit children of school
age to excuse themselves without cause.133 The purpose of the com-
pulsory attendance laws is to assure that all children receive a mini-
mum education. 34
The compulsory education laws are designed to meet the educa-
tional goals outlined in the Illinois Constitution. 135 In fact, the Illinois
Constitution mandates a right to an education. 136 These provisions in
the Illinois Constitution mean that, although education is not a funda-
129. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2. Employees injured on the job have two principal means of
statutory recovery: the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act and the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act.
130. See supra Part I.A.3. Naturally, recovery for employees of school districts (e.g., teachers)
would not only require that one of these exceptions be met, but also an exception to the school
district's immunity in the Tort Immunity Act. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
131. Under due process requirements, a "student facing a suspension of ten days or less must
be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
of the evidence the [school] authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story."
3 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, § 9.05 [2] [b] (1998).
132. The Illinois School Code provides that "[w]hoever has custody or control over a child
between the ages of 7 and 16 shall cause such child to attend some public school." 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (West 1996). A similar provision provides that "[a]ny person having custody
or control of a child who is below the age of 7 years or above the age of 16 years and who is
enrolled in any of grades 1 through 12... shall cause [such a child] to attend" public schools. Id.
5/26-2.
133. For children between the ages of 7 and 16 years, the Illinois School Code includes five
exceptions: a student in private school; a student physically or mentally unable to attend school
due to disability; a child lawfully employed; a child in confirmation classes; and a child absent
due to the tenants of his/her religion. Id. 5/26-1. For those children under 7 and over 16 years
who are enrolled in grades 1 through 12, there is one notable exception: A district may deny
enrollment to any child above 16 who has dropped out and who could not graduate before his or
her twenty-first birthday. Id. 5/26-2.
134. See Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Terrile, 361 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
135. A portion of the education article of the Illinois Constitution provides: "A fundamental
goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free."
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; see Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 679 N.E.2d 831, 834-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
136. See Lewis E., 679 N.E.2d at 835.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:907
mental constitutional right under the United States Constitution,137
Illinois must provide each student with the service of education be-
cause it has promised that service in its own Constitution.138
1. Due Process Required for Suspension and Expulsion
Considering the legal provisions in Illinois assuring a free education
for all students, a school district cannot suspend or expel a student at
will. 139 Specifically, pupils guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct
may be expelled only after they have received proper due process. 140
If due process is provided, however, school officials may exercise their
authority under the school board regulations and suspend or expel
students guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct. 141 As may be ex-
pected, the more serious violations of school policies, such as bringing
a weapon to school, result in lengthier suspensions. 42
137. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of course,
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we
find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
138. See Lewis E., 679 N.E.2d at 838.
139. See supra note 135.
140. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(a) (West Supp. 1996).
Expulsion shall take place only after the parents.have been requested to appear at a
meeting of the board, or with a hearing officer appointed by it, to discuss their child's
behavior. Such request shall be made by registered or certified mail and shall state the
time, place and purpose of the meeting. The board, or a hearing officer appointed by it,
at such meeting shall state the reasons for dismissal and the date on which the expul-
sion is to become effective. If a hearing officer is appointed by the board he shall
report to the board a written summary of the evidence heard at the meeting and the
board may take such action thereon as it finds appropriate.
Id.
141. See id. 5/10-22.6(b).
The board may by regulation authorize the superintendent of the district or the princi-
pal, assistant principal, or dean of students of any school to suspend pupils guilty of
such acts for a period not to exceed 10 school days. If a pupil is suspended due to gross
disobedience or misconduct on a school bus, the board may suspend the pupil in excess
of 10 school days for safety reasons. Any suspension shall be reported immediately to
the parents or guardian of such pupil along with a full statement of the reasons for such
suspension and a notice of their right to a review, a copy of which shall be given to the
school board. Upon request of the parents or guardian the school board or a hearing
officer appointed by it shall review such action of the superintendent or principal, assis-
tant principal, or dean of students. At such review the parents or guardian of the pupil
may appear and discuss the suspension with the board or its hearing officer. If a hear-
ing officer is appointed by the board he shall report to the board a written summary of
the evidence heard at the meeting. After its hearing or upon receipt of the written
report of its hearing officer, the board may take such action as finds appropriate.
Id.
142. See id. 5/10-22.6(d).
A student who is determined to have brought a weapon to school, any school-spon-
sored activity or event, or any activity or event which bears a reasonable relationship to
1999] VIOLENT STUDENTS
In short, although students have due process rights, school officials
may still suspend or expel them without violating their constitutional
rights.143 Both suspension and expulsion remain not only a constitu-
tionally acceptable means of punishment, 144 but also forms of punish-
ment that fall within the limited discretion of the local school board. 145
Suspension or expulsion of students violates neither the Illinois Con-
stitution nor the United States Constitution: The legislative provisions
permitting suspension or expulsion of students guilty of gross disobe-
dience or misconduct are neither void for vagueness and overbreadth,
nor do they run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 46 Finally, the requirement that a student receive notice
before suspension or expulsion can be satisfied rather easily by school
officials. 147
school shall be expelled for a period of not less than one year, except that the expulsion
period may be modified by the board on a case by case basis.
Id. Longer suspensions, expulsions or other substantial disciplinary actions require more formal
due process procedures. Though these may vary depending upon the circumstances, they usually
require that the student be given: (1) written notice of the charges against him; (2) the names of
the witnesses against him and an oral or written report of the facts to which each witness will
testify, and perhaps the opportunity to cross-examine them; (3) the opportunity to present evi-
dence; (4) a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the hearing; and (5) the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. 3 RAPP, supra note 131, § 9.05 [3] [b].
But even those students who are guilty of these most egregious violations (e.g., bringing a
weapon to school) are eligible for transfer into alternative schools. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
13A-4.
A student who is determined to be subject to suspension or expulsion in the manner
provided by Section 10-22.6 ... may be immediately transferred to the alternative pro-
gram. At the earliest time following that transfer appropriate personnel from the send-
ing school district and appropriate personnel of the alternative program shall meet to
develop an alternative education plan for the student. The student's parent or guardian
shall be invited to this meeting. The student may be invited.
Id. The alternative educational plan shall include a duration, "including a date after which the
student may be returned to a regular educational program." Id.
A recent Chicago public school policy calls for the automatic expulsion of students who carry
weapons or commit other dangerous acts during school hours on school property. Jacquelyn
Heard, Off-Campus Crime Spells Expulsion from School, CHI. TRIB, Mar. 11, 1997, § 2, at 1. The
new policy even calls for the expulsion of students who commit violent acts on weekends away
from school grounds. Id. While this new policy seems encouraging, the rising number of assaults
on teachers and relatively low number of student expulsions suggest that it is not being strictly
followed. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 131.
144. See Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the legis-
lative provisions authorizing local school boards to utilize suspension or expulsion as disciplinary
measures for gross disobedience is a constitutionally acceptable means for imposition of such
sanctions for conduct defined by local school code governing student conduct).
145. See Washington v. Smith, 618 N.E.2d 561, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that expulsion
of student is within discretion of the school board, but the discretion does have limits).
146. See Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 897 (N.D. 11. 1970).
147. See, e.g., Baxter v. Round Lake Area Sch., 856 F. Supp. 438, 445 (N.D. I11. 1994) (holding
that the notice requirement was satisfied and a high school student's due process rights were not
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2. Chicago School District Policy Regarding Suspension and
Expulsion
Like all school districts in Illinois, the Chicago school district has its
own guidelines for disciplining students who have committed violent
acts.148 These guidelines for suspension and expulsion of those stu-
dents who are found guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct are
found in the Chicago Public Schools Uniform Discipline Code
("UDC").149 The UDC attempts to establish a "Zero Tolerance Pol-
icy" for those students who seriously disrupt the educational pro-
cess. 150 The UDC's goals include the codification of penalties for
students and the establishment of zero tolerance for certain acts of
misconduct. 15' The UDC further outlines the rights and responsibili-
ties of students, parents, teachers, and principals. Teacher rights in-
clude the right to "[b]e free from any physical or verbal threats while
carrying out teaching and other duties."'1 52 Principal responsibilities in-
clude establishing "a discipline committee and work[ing] with staff to
violated when a student was taken to the dean's office immediately after a fight and given a
chance to tell his side of the story).
Rudimentary due process does not require that a student be afforded the opportunity
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to
call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident. Instead, it requires only that
a person do what a fairminded person would impose upon himself in order to avoid
unfair suspensions.
3 RAPP, supra note 131, § 9.05 [2] [b].
148. See MARIE SOMERS HILL & FRANK W. HILL, CREATING SAFE SCHOOLS: WHAT PRINCI-
PALS CAN Do 76 (1994).
Uniform procedures and understanding must be established throughout the district re-
garding expectations in dealing with school crime. Aggressive behavior, intimidation,
extortion, assault, sexual harassment, and other common forms of school crime cannot
be tolerated, denied, or ignored. If these acts are allowed, the frequency and magni-
tude of crime will continue to increase. Consistently enforcing policy is labor-intensive,
but it is critical that procedures are followed.
The superintendent and school board should sponsor development of a code of conduct
for the entire system, with student rights and responsibilities carefully outlined. The
code should be developed by a representative group of principals, teachers, students,
parents, and community members. The final policy must contain clearly defined conse-
quences for unacceptable behavior. Policy created with input from each school will
assist in consistent enforcement. Annual reviews of the code are important to amend
identified ambiguity or changing needs.
Id.
149. CHICAGO SCH. REFORM BD. OF TRUSTEES, UNIFORM DISCIPLINE CODE (1997).
150. Id. at 3 ("A Zero Tolerance Policy will be enforced for students who commit acts of
misconduct which seriously disrupt the orderly educational process. Those who are found to
possess illegal drugs, firearms, or other dangerous weapons will be suspended immediately and
face possible expulsion.").
151. Id.
152. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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develop and enforce school regulations, relating them to systemwide
policies." 153
Significantly, the UDC outlines six separate groups of misconduct,
ranging from "inappropriate" conduct to that conduct which "most
seriously" disrupts the school. 154 A disciplinary action is recom-
mended for each group of misconduct, including minimum and maxi-
mum penalties for first and repeated violations, respectively. 55 Taken
153. Id. at 9.
154. Group 1 acts of misconduct "include inappropriate student behaviors in the classroom or
on the school grounds, such as the following:" "Running and/or making excessive noise in the
hall or building," "[leaving the classroom without permission," etc. Id. at 12.
Group 2 acts of misconduct "include those student behaviors that disrupt the orderly educa-
tional process in the school or on the school grounds, such as the following:" "Exhibiting any
hostile physical actions," "[diefying (disobeying) the authority of school personnel," etc. Id.
Group 3 acts of misconduct "include those student behaviors that seriously disrupt the orderly
educational process in the classroom, in the school, and/or on the school grounds, such as the
following:" "Fighting - two people, no injuries," "[plersisting acts of disobedience or miscon-
duct," "[a]ny behavior that is seriously disruptive," etc. Id. at 13.
Group 4 acts of misconduct "include those student behaviors that very seriously disrupt the
orderly educational process in the classroom, in the school, and/or on the school grounds." Id.
In many cases, these acts are also illegal: "Extortion," "[a]ssault," "[b]attery," fighting when
more than two people are involved and injuries occur, etc. Id.
Group 5 acts of misconduct "include those illegal student behaviors that most seriously disrupt
the orderly educational process in the Chicago Public Schools, such as the following:" "Aggra-
vated assault," "[u]se of intimidation, coercion, or force," "[d]isorderly conduct," "[e]ngaging in
any other illegal behavior which interferes with the school's educational process," "[g]ang activ-
ity which interferes with the school's educational process," "[g]ross disobedience," etc. Id. at 14.
Group 6 acts of misconduct "include the illegal student behaviors that not only most seriously
disrupt the orderly educational process in the Chicago Public Schools but also mandate" specific
disciplinary action: "Use, possession, and/or concealment of a firearm/destructive device or
other weapon," "[s]ex violations," "[a]ggravated battery," "[m]urder," "[a]ttempted murder,"
"[k]idnapping," etc. Id.
155. CHICAGO SCH. REFORM BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 149, at 12. For a first violation of
Group 1 acts of misconduct, the minimum penalty is a teacher-student conference; the maximum
penalty is a teacher-student-parent conference. Id. For repeated or flagrant violations, the mini-
mum penalty is a teacher-student-parent-resource person-administrator conference; the maxi-
mum penalty is an in-school suspension. Id.
For a first violation of Group 2 acts of misconduct, the minimum penalty is a teacher-student
conference; the maximum penalty is a teacher-student-parent-resource person-administrator
conference. Id. For repeated or flagrant violations, the minimum penalty is an in-school suspen-
sion; the maximum penalty is a one to five day suspension or disciplinary reassignment. Id.
For a first violation of Group 3 acts of misconduct, the minimum penalty is a teacher-student-
parent-resource person-administrator conference; the maximum violation is a one to five day
suspension. Id. at 13. For repeated or flagrant violations, the minimum penalty is a one to five
day suspension; the maximum penalty is a six to ten day suspension, disciplinary reassignment
and/or reassignment. Id.
For Group 4 acts of misconduct, the minimum penalty is a teacher-student-parent-resource
person-administrator conference; the maximum penalty is a one to ten day suspension, discipli-
nary reassignment, and police notification. Id.
For Group 5 acts of misconduct, the penalty is "Suspension (six to 10 days) and/or Disciplinary
Reassignment and/or Police Notification. Both arrest by the Police and expulsion. If a student is
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literally, the UDC could potentially permit students who have repeat-
edly committed violent acts to be reinstated into the classroom. 156
3. A School District's Interest in Reinstating Students
If the Chicago school district can rightfully expel problem students
through a due process procedure that is easily met by following its
own codified guidelines, then why does the Chicago school district
consistently reinstate those students who have shown a propensity to
commit violent acts? Perhaps the answer lies in funding. "Public
schools receive funds from various federal, state, and local sources."'1 57
First, "school districts are authorized to levy property taxes for vari-
ous school purposes up to specified maximum rates."'1 58 Second, the
state provides assistance to school districts through either categorical
grants159 or general state aid from the state's common school fund
pursuant to the formula set forth in the School Code.' 60
This general state aid is distributed based on the weighted average
daily attendance ("ADA") at schools within a particular district and
on the equalized assessed valuation of property ("EAV") in the dis-
trict.161 "The amount of general state aid per pupil that a particular
district receives is calculated by subtracting the district's EAV per
weighted ADA pupil from the guaranteed EAV and multiplying the
difference by the foundation rate.' 162
Though the computations for funding are complex and vary greatly,
the general provision common to all computations is that school fund-
expelled, Alternative School Placement may be recommended for the period of the expulsion."
Id. at 14.
For Group 6 acts of misconduct, the penalty is "Police notification and/or arrest, suspension
for 10 days, and expulsion for a period of not less than one calendar year, or as modified on a
case-by-case review by the Chief Executive Officer or designee. Alternative School Placement
may be recommended for the period of the expulsion." Id.
"Disciplinary reassignment . . . includes transfer to another room or school or alternative
school placement for a specific period of time." Id. at 15.
"Suspension" means "[tlhe involuntary removal of a student from class attendance or school
attendance for 10 days or less. Suspension may not be used serially for a single act of miscon-
duct." Id. at 16.
"Expulsion" means "[t]he removal a student form school for 11 days or more, to a maximum
of two school years." Id. at 15.
156. Id. at 14.
157. Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (I11. 1996).
158. Id. (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-2, 5/34-53 (West 1996)).
159. Id. (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-3.51 (West Supp. 1996)).
160. Id. (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8 (West Supp. 1996), amended by 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/18-8.05 (West Supp. 1996)).
161. Id.
162. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8(A)(5)(d)(2)).
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ing is based on student attendance. 163 The conclusion is simple: The
more students a school enrolls, and the better the attendance rates of
those students, the more money a school district will receive.
II. ANALYSIS
This article has discussed the statutory and common law remedies
available to teachers injured on the job, as well as the basic principles
of both tort immunity and school attendance. What remains now is to
determine the effectiveness of the statutory remedies for teachers who
are injured by violent students. Part II will examine the extent to
which these remedies are ineffective and, in some cases, inappropri-
ate.164 Part II then presents arguments for abandoning the Workers'
Compensation Act exclusivity provisions, penetrating the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act, and permitting teachers to recover in tort from the
Chicago school district. 165 The section concludes by offering sugges-
tions to protect teachers from violent students who are reinstated into
the school system. 166
A. The Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act
As the current law now stands, the Chicago school district could
face liability through the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act,
yet the courts need to take a more active role in compensating teach-
ers. The Act compensates employees for mental illness that results
from a traumatic event experienced while on the job.167 Any one of
the number of assaults on teachers in the past years,168 or even the
large number of student-on-student assaults of which any teacher
could be a witness,169 could be such a traumatic event which triggers
psychological injury.
In the past, teachers have failed to recover for emotional illness
under the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act because they
had a prior history of psychological illness, and there was no event
163. See generally 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05 (providing a complete formula for determin-
ing state aid to public schools).
164. See infra Part II.A.
165. See infra Part II.B.
166. See infra Part II.C.
167. See supra Part I.A.1.
168. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Recovery for psychological trauma under
these circumstances would be under the "mental-physical" paradigm. See supra note 38.
169. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. Recovery for psychological trauma under
these circumstances would be under the "mental-mental" paradigm. See supra note 38.
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significant enough to trigger a mental illness.170 In Moore,17 1 the
plaintiff was a teacher who sought compensation for depression that
resulted from a series of on-the-job incidents: kicked and scratched by
a female student while breaking up a fight; kicked and bitten by an-
other student who was engaged in a fight; chased from the schoolyard
by twelve to fifteen students and struck by a rock.172 The court, how-
ever, denied the plaintiff recovery because he was unable to establish
a causal connection between the work conditions and the occupational
disease, 73 and further, because his emotional disorders resulted from
trauma that was no more than a part of the day-to-day emotional
strain and tension that all employees experience. 74 The court noted,
"Unruly students, an unresponsive administration, and the burdens of
paperwork and record keeping are not unusual."'1 75 Also, the court
observed that the plaintiff's breakdown did not occur until after the
plaintiff left his employment, and that the plaintiff had other sources
of his emotional problems besides his employment.176
170. See, e.g., Stice, 538 N.E.2d 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). In Stice, the plaintiff was a teacher
who tried to obtain recovery under the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act for deepen-
ing depression resulting from frustration over his job. Id. at 832. The plaintiff's depression re-
sulted from an incident in which a student slapped him in the face. Id. at 831. The court noted
that the plaintiff had been depressed for most of his life, and that the slap on the face was not an
extraordinary event which could be said to trigger the plaintiffs depression. Id. at 833.
171. 523 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
172. Id. at 914.
173. Id. at 917.
The causal connection between claimant's mental disability and the gradual mental
stimuli which allegedly produced the disease is not readily apparent. Whereas the ra-
tional mind can perceive a clear connection between exposure to asbestos and the sub-
sequent contraction of asbestosis, for instance, there is a much more tenuous link in a
situation where a person suffers a gradually developing mental disability which, in ret-
rospect, is attributed to factors such as worry, anxiety, tension, pressure, and overwork
without proof of a specific time, place, and event producing the disability.
Id.
174. Id. at 918 ("Stated differently, mental disorders not resulting from trauma must arise
from a situation of greater dimensions than the day to day emotional strain and tension which all
employees must experience.").
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
Although claimant expressed fear for his safety, we find it significant that none of the
events he described occurring over an extended period of years produced any demon-
strable symptoms of mental disturbance coextensive with the events allegedly precipi-
tating the fear. In fact, claimant's breakdown did not occur while in the course of
employment with the Board. Rather, the first evidence of mental disability surfaced at
the conclusion of summer vacation prior to the start of a new school year.
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Cases such as the Moore decision show that courts should ease their
standard for what they refer to as a traumatic event.177 The cases
show that the courts are out of touch with the current public educa-
tion climate, 178 and need to be less indulgent of student conduct to-
wards teachers. The courts are too tolerant of dangerous conditions
created by unruly students and the district that reinstates them.179
Psychological harm, if clearly traceable to incidents which surpass the
degree of abuse that the teacher experienced in Moore, should meet
the standard for compensation under the Illinois Workers' Occupa-
tional Diseases Act. In any event, the Chicago school district could be
liable to teachers if the facts follow the standard implied by these deci-
sions: If a teacher, who does not have a history of mental illness, ex-
periences emotional trauma as a result of a single, traumatic event.180
B. Penetrating the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act Exclusivity
Provisions and Tort Immunity
The mere existence of the Workers' Compensation Act-and the
Occupational Diseases Act-means that an employee is limited to
only that statutory recovery.' 8' Despite the costs arising out of these
statutory schemes, the Chicago school district continues to place its
177. The courts' reluctance to compensate teachers under these circumstances stems from the
belief that allowing teachers to recover would enable any employee to obtain compensation for
stress experienced at work. As the Moore court reasoned, "To recognize that our occupational
disease law would allow compensation for any mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-
job stressful events or conditions would, in the words of one court, open a floodgate for workers
who succumb to the everyday pressures of life." 523 N.E.2d at 917.
To these concerns, this Comment poses two considerations. First, a teacher unfortunate
enough to be either the victim of an assault or the witness to a student's violent act is experienc-
ing something closer to the claimant in Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 343 N.E.2d 913, 915
(IU. 1976), than the claimant in Moore, 523 N.E.2d at 914. Second, increasing the number of
short-term claims under the Illinois Workers' Occupational Diseases Act for teachers assaulted
by students would have the same deterrence effect of a large damage verdict. A school district
would be compelled to adopt procedures to protect teachers (e.g., expelling violent students and
notifying teachers if those students are reinstated into the classroom), thereby reducing, in the
long-term, the number of assaults on teachers and subsequent claims.
178. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. For instance, the Moore court described
the students who mistreated the teachers as merely "unruly" and not unusual. Moore, 523
N.E.2d at 914.
180. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text. Under this proposed set of circum-
stances, recovery should be obtained because the two obstacles which prevented recovery for the
teachers in Moore and Stice were a prior history of mental illness and the absence of a single,
traumatic event. Considering the number of violent incidents that occur daily in the Chicago
school district, such recovery is inevitable.
181. See supra Part I.A.2. Besides these exclusivity provisions, the Chicago school district
enjoys additional immunity from tort suits through the Tort Immunity Act and the Illinois
School Code. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2, I.C.
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teachers in peril by reinstating violent students into the classrooms. 182
With this in mind, teachers should not have their liability limited to
workers' compensation statutes. In situations where the school has
the unique knowledge that a student has shown a propensity to com-
mit violence, and the school still reinstates that student into the class-
room without giving the teacher notice, the teacher should be able to
obtain a large damage verdict in tort from the school district.
1. Penetrating the Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Rule
Despite the courts' tolerance for unruly students in the Illinois
Workers' Occupational Diseases Act cases,183 the Chicago school dis-
trict still faces large costs through the Workers' Compensation Act.184
Yet, compensation to a teacher who has been injured by a student
while in school simply does not fit neatly behind the social policy driv-
ing the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. 185
Workers' compensation-and more importantly, its exclusivity provi-
sions-are driven by a specific social philosophy: that the employee
receive efficient and reliable compensation. 86 The burden of this
compensation is justified because the payments are allocated to the
most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.187
These social policy principles weaken when applied to the case
where a teacher is assaulted by a student. The school district does not
produce a product that could alter the market in such a way to shoul-
der the burden of the workers' compensation system. Furthermore,
182. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. In the school years 1995-96 and 1996-97,
898 and 1,026 students were reinstated into the school system after assaulting teachers. Kass,
supra note 8, at 1.
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. See supra Part I.A.2 (stating that the Chicago school district must compensate its employ-
ees for injuries occurring while on the job).
185. See supra Part I.A.2. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act compensates employees
for work-related injuries. The existence of this statutory compensation-and not the employee's
election to seek remedy pursuant to its provision-means that it is the exclusive remedy for
employees injured while on the job.
186. See supra Part I.A.2. Part of the logic of this policy follows the logic of strict liability in
tort, that when a person carries on a hazardous undertaking with enough social utility to prevent
the law from prohibiting it altogether, the law will allow the person to carry on the activity only
if the person assumes all liability without fault for any consequent injuries. See supra note 46
and accompanying text. Nothing in this policy, however, suggests that the person carrying on the
activity should blindly perpetuate a dangerous, hazardous activity without caution simply be-
cause he or she would be liable anyway. By analogy, therefore, no policy driving workers' com-
pensation suggests that the employer maintain unsafe work conditions simply because the
employer would be liable anyway.
187. See supra Part I.A.2. The liability created by workers' compensation is meant to help the
employee while protecting the employer: The compensation provides the route whereby the cost
of the system is passed on to the consumer public in an "orderly fashion."
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the consumer in this situation, who ultimately pays the higher price
for the consistent reliance on the workers' compensation system, is the
taxpayer.188 As teachers experience injuries at the hands of students
who are consistently reinstated into the school district after showing a
propensity for violence, 18 9 the taxpayer shoulders an increasing bur-
den of a system that does little to protect its teachers.' 90
Extending teacher recovery beyond the workers' compensation
statutes also follows the general rule which states that workers' com-
pensation does not preclude common law actions against co-employ-
ees or others for their intentional torts.19' In fact, when a teacher is
assaulted by a student, nothing prevents the teacher from electing
common law recovery from the student, as opposed to the workers'
compensation remedy.' 92 More often than not, however, the teacher
will not opt for such a recovery because the student will be judgment-
proof.193 The law and the courts should acknowledge the limitations
on a teacher's common law recovery for the intentional torts commit-
ted by these students and permit recovery from the school district be-
yond workers' compensation statutes.
Additionally, teachers should not have their recovery limited to
workers' compensation alone, because the system has done little to
compel practical solutions to protecting teachers.194 In past years,
Chicago schools have floundered in a number of ineffective attempts
at protecting teachers: using street gangs to monitor security; 95 imple-
188. See supra Part I.D.3 (finding that public schools receive state assistance from the state's
common school fund, which is generated, in part, from local property taxes).
189. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
190. The strong counter-argument here is that the teacher is already receiving compensation
through an efficient workers' compensation statute. Yet, as this Comment suggests, this system
is doing nothing to lower the number of assaults on teachers. The very efficiency and low cost to
the employer, in fact, have done nothing to compel the Chicago school district to take action to
protect its teachers from students with a history of violence.
191. Ulrich & Schiff, supra note 43, at 1005 (citing Vance v. Wentling, 619 N.E.2d 902 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1993)).
192. See Vance, 619 N.E.2d at 904 ("Thus, while the Act does not provide the exclusive rem-
edy for an individual injured as a result of a co-employee's intentional conduct, the injured
individual is, in effect, bound to an election of remedies upon receiving compensation under the
Act.") (citations omitted).
193. The statutory scheme for funding, after all, indicates a recognition that many students
come from low income families. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-8.05 (West Supp. 1996).
194. This belief is supported by the fact that, while statutory compensation has been available
to teachers assaulted on the job, the number of assaults on teachers has been increasing.
195. At Englewood Technical Preparatory Academy, a system was in place in which local
gangs monitored and disciplined gang-affiliated students with corporal punishment. Jerry
Thomas & Andrew Martin, Some Hint Gang Links Lead to Coach's Killing, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16,
1996, § 1, at 1. The program was dismantled when Chicago Public Schools Chief Executive Of-
ficer Paul Vallas replaced the Principal. Id.
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menting general security plans;196  and instituting alternative
schools. 197 Some outsiders have even suggested corporal punish-
ment.198 Then again, perhaps the Chicago school district has aban-
doned their efforts at protecting teachers. In July, 1997, the Chicago
public school system began developing a general fund to offset medi-
cal and other expenses incurred when teachers and students are vic-
tims of violent crimes. 199 The fund's existence alone suggests that the
Chicago school district's reliance on workers' compensation is not
only an ineffective impetus for developing procedures to protect
teachers, but also an insufficient means of compensating victims.
2. Penetrating Tort Immunity: The Tort Immunity Act and Illinois
School Code
Permitting teachers to recover from the school district after being
assaulted by a student with a known history of violence involves a
second hurdle beyond the exclusivity provisions of workers' compen-
sation: immunity through the Tort Immunity Act and the Illinois
School Code. The following subsections, however, suggest why this
196. At first blush, the solution may appear simple, as one principal noted: Increased adult
visibility prevents students from even thinking of doing anything wrong. V. Dion Hayes, Keep-
ing Schools Cool: More Security, Police and Metal Detectors Help Make Classrooms in Chicago a
lot Safer, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1994, § 2, at 2.
However, the presence of a teacher does not prevent student violence, an obvious observation
considering the growing number of student assaults on teachers. Additionally, cost of security
equipment is prohibitive: At Farragut High School alone, $200,000 was spent on surveillance
cameras, TV monitors, walkie-talkies, and security guards. Id.
197. Alternative schools are a popular method of alleviating the problem of teachers exposed
to student violence. The schools would instruct chronically disruptive students, providing them
with a structured environment and innovative teaching methods, and exposing them to only one
or two teachers a day instead of seven. However, no one is sure where the additional money will
come from for the new schools, and the schools by their very nature still imply that teachers will
be exposed to potentially violent students. Casey Banas, Alternative Schools for Unruly Kids
Look Good-on Paper, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1995, § 2, at 4.
198. Most agree that this is probably not a realistic, or even desirable, alternative. As one
Chicago teacher poignantly remarked:
You think I'd be crazy enough to paddle some overgrown kid who's liable to pick up
my chair and break it over my head? I had one guy threaten to bring his gang around
and blow me away if I gave him a failing grade ... [W]e're smart enough not to pro-
voke [students]. That's the secret. Don't get them mad at you.
Mike Royko, Spare the Rod, Save Your Hide, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1987, § 1, at 2.
Besides, the UDC explicitly reminds teachers: "Staff are reminded that Board of Trustees
Rule 6-21 states: 'No employee of the Board of Education may inflict corporal punishment of
any kind upon persons attending the public school in the City of Chicago."' CHICAGo SCH.
REFORM BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 149, at 8.
199. Ka Vang, School Fund to Help Ease Pain of Violent Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1997,
§ 2, at 4. A seven-member committee of teachers, principals and community members will over-
see the crisis support fund which, ironically enough, will be supported by school employees who
choose to have donations deducted from their paychecks. Id.
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immunity should be overcome so that teachers can recover from the
school district in tort.
a. The School District's Failure to Comply with the Law
Although the Chicago school district's immunity from tort actions is
difficult to overcome, it can be penetrated when the school district
fails to comply with the law.2° A provision of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 provides for a reciprocal reporting system concerning a minor
enrolled within the school district.20 1 Under this statute, law enforce-
ment records are to be transmitted to the appropriate school official
by a local law enforcement agency when a student has been arrested
or taken into custody.20 2 This includes arrest for the following of-
fenses:20 3 (1) the unlawful use of weapons under § 24-1 of the Crimi-
nal Code of 1961;204 (2) a violation of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act;20 5 (3) a violation of the Cannabis Control Act;20 6 and
(4) a forcible felony as defined in § 2-8 of the Criminal Code of
1961.207
The reciprocal reporting system provides appropriate school offi-
cials with access to records which indicate which students have a pro-
pensity for violence.208 Notwithstanding the fact that the statute does
not require that the teacher receive the information,20 9 it is of little use
if the school official does nothing to inform the teacher of the violent
propensities of certain students. In any event, the statute's language
requires that a parent-teacher advisory committee and the school
board, in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, establish
200. See supra Part I.B.2. While the Tort Immunity Act immunizes a governmental entity for
the failure to enforce a law, it does not immunize a governmental entity for the failure to comply
with a law.
201. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-7(A)(8) (West 1996); see 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.14
(West 1996). The main provision requires, "The [parent-teacher advisory] committee in cooper-
ation with local law enforcement agencies shall develop, with the school board, policy guideline
procedures to establish and maintain a reciprocal reporting system between the school district
and local law enforcement agencies regarding criminal offenses committed by students." Id.
The reciprocal reporting system is one of the rare exceptions to the confidentiality provisions of
the Juvenile Court Act. See generally 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-7 (defining the confidentiality
to law enforcement records).
202. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-7(A)(8).
203. See id.




208. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.14(b) (West 1996).
209. Id. (referring only to a system that must be developed between the school board, parent-
teacher advisory committee, and local law enforcement agency).
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and maintain a reciprocal reporting system.210 The absence of such a
system between local police precincts and local schools suggests a fail-
ure to comply with the law. 21 '
b. The Special Relationship Between the School District and its
Teachers
The immunity that the Chicago school district enjoys as a munici-
pality should not be a factor because there is a special relationship
between it and the teachers it employs. In fact, the four elements that
make up a special duty-awareness of a particular danger to the plain-
tiff, allegations of acts or omissions on the part of the municipality, the
acts or omissions are either affirmative or willful in nature, and the
injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and immediate
control of agents of the municipality 212-could be met by teacher-
plaintiffs suing the district after an assault by a student.
Once the school district disciplines a student for a violent act, the
school district is in a unique position to know that the student presents
a particular risk, and the limited number of teachers that the student
faces each day represent particular plaintiffs. 21 3 The act or omission
on behalf of the school district is two-fold: The district acts to cause
the teacher's injury by reinstating the student into the classroom with-
out providing notice, and the district fails to prevent the harm by ex-
pelling a violent student.214 Finally, the teacher is under control of the
210. Id.
211. See supra Part I.B.2; cf Mueller v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 666
(I11. App. Ct. 1997) (concluding that the school district's failure to comply with a law requiring
criminal background checks on all employees "vitiated" the immunity the school district might
otherwise have claimed for the exercise of discretionary authority). Because this would be a
failure to comply with the law, the school district would not receive immunity on the basis of § 2-
103, which grants immunity from liability for injury resulting from the failure to enforce a law.
See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-103 (West 1996); Mueller, 678 N.E.2d at 666:
212. See supra Part I.B.1.
213. Admittedly, this "unique awareness" element is difficult to establish and requires knowl-
edge of a particular risk to a particular plaintiff. See supra Part I.B.1. But cf. Thames v. Board of
Educ., 645 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (failing to meet element because the school had
no knowledge that the particular student with gun had a history of violence, and furthermore the
plaintiff was one of hundreds of fellow students).
214. Clearly, the Chicago school district-not the teacher-is responsible for enrolling stu-
dents back in school. See supra Part I.D. In effect, this sets up a self-serving system, in which the
school district re-enrolls students to keep enrollment numbers up so that it receives more money.
See supra Part I.D.3. Teachers' interests in a safe work environment must outweigh student due
process rights. This is especially true in light of the consistent caselaw which reveals the minimal
difficulty in expelling students. See supra Part I.D.1, This effectively shows that for the Chicago




school district because the school district is the party which causes the
need for protection by reinstating violent students.215
c. The School District Is Liable for Acts Outside the Negligence of
its Own Employees
Holding the school district liable as a result of the "special duty" it
owes teachers would follow cases like Sidwell, which hold the district
liable for acts outside the negligence of teachers.2 16 In Sidwell, the
school district was held liable for its negligence in ignoring a rut in the
playground;2 17 likewise, the Chicago school district should be held lia-
ble for its negligence in ignoring the problem posed by a violent stu-
dent consistently reinstated into the classroom. In Sidwell, the injury
the student received was said to result from the school district's failure
to deal with the problem posed by the playground conditions;218 like-
wise, the injury a teacher receives from a violent student could be said
to result from the Chicago school district's failure to deny the student
reinstatement into the school, or at least warn the teacher of the stu-
dent's violent propensities.
215. See, e.g., Moore, 523 N.E.2d 912, 914 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (complaining that student who
had earlier broken another teacher's leg was placed in claimant's classroom, but there was noth-
ing claimant could do about it). The obstacle here may be that the courts could follow the
reasoning of Thames and argue that this element is met only when the public employee initiates
the circumstances which create the dangerous situation. 645 N.E.2d at 452 (concluding that the
student, not the school district defendant, initiated the dangerous situation). However, the
Thames court also observed that a "pivotal fact" is whether the public entity or its employees
were responsible for the occurrence which gave rise to the need for protection. Id. Following
this analysis, under circumstances where a student is known as having a history of violence, the
school officials' consistent reinstatement of that student into the classroom without notifying the
teacher surely makes the officials responsible for the occurrence which gives rise to the need for
protection.
216. SidweU v. Griggsville Community Sch. Dist. No. 4, 588 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ill. 1992) (con-
cluding that Illinois School Code does not immunize a school district for negligence outside the
acts of a teacher).
In at least one important respect, those cases are distinguishable: The plaintiff is not an em-
ployee of the school district. Because of this, the plaintiff, unlike the teacher, cannot recover
from the school district through workers' compensation statutes. While the argument here is
that teachers should have recovery beyond workers' compensation, the school district liability to
non-employees shows other means-besides workers' compensation-that it can be held liable.
See supra Part I.C.
217. Sidwell, 588 N.E.2d at 1186.
218. Id.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew or should have known about the rut in time to
repair it, and that the defendant had been negligent in one or more of three ways:
allowing the rut to be formed and to deepen, failing to fill in the rut, and allowing the
plaintiff to use the part of the playground where the rut was located.
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d. School District Liability Follows the Line of Cases Where
Employers Are Liable for Third-Party Assaults
Extending teacher recovery beyond statutory compensation in cases
where teachers are injured by a student the school district knows has a
propensity for violence follows the courts' reasoning in the three sets
of cases where an employer is liable for the foreseeable criminal acts
of third parties.219
First, the situation between the Chicago school district, its teachers,
and the student follows the caselaw which finds employer liability
when the employer knows of a danger and fails to warn the em-
ployee.220 In Petersen, the court refused to make the employer liable
for inchoate threats to unspecified persons, made by an unidentifiable
assailant.221 In the case of the Chicago school district, however, the
219. See supra Part I.A.3. In these cases, recovery was not limited to workers' compensation,
because the defendant was not clearly the employer, or the injuries did not occur while the
employee was on the job. However, the argument presented here is that the Chicago school
district should not be permitted to hide behind the fortuitous exclusivity provisions of workers'
compensation, simply because the persisting problem just happens to occur in the course of
employment. See supra Part I.A.3.
220. In Petersen v. United States Reduction Co., 641 N.E.2d 845 (II. App. Ct. 1994), the court
noted that:
A principal is subject to liability in an action of tort for failing to use care to warn an
agent of an unreasonable risk involved in the employment, if the principal should real-
ize that it exists and that the agent is likely not to become aware of it, thereby suffering
harm.
Id. at 850 (quotations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 471 (1958)).
The fact pattern presented here with the school district and its students is distinguishable from
those cases in which the court determined that the employer was not liable under these circum-
stances. See supra Part I.A.3. The one case in which the plaintiff-employee was able to recover,
Hefele v. New York, 267 N.Y.S.2d 946 (App. Div. 1966), is under New York law. As such, it
deserves brief mention here, but employee recovery for third party assaults that the employer
knew of will best be illustrated by Petersen, 641 N.E.2d 845.
In Hefele, the plaintiff was attacked by her client, who had a known history of belligerent
behavior. 267 N.Y.S.2d at 948. Like the client in Hefele, the student enrolled in the school
district is known by the district as having a history of violence. The plaintiff in Hefele sued her
employer for its failure to warn her that the client was not away from the residence the plaintiff
was visiting at the time the assault took place. Id. at 949. The employer in Hefele may have been
in a position to warn the plaintiff, just as the school district is in a position to warn teachers when
students with a history of violence are being reinstated into their classrooms. The Hefele court
noted that in light of the violent propensities of the assailant, and the plaintiff's required attend-
ance at the residence, the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injuries was a question of fact that the
plaintiff could have settled by a jury. Id. Finally, as the plaintiff in Hefele was required to report
to the apartment in which the assault took place, id., so also are teachers required to teach any
students the district desires to put before them.
221. Petersen, 641 N.E.2d at 850. Foreseeability is often a large hurdle for the plaintiff in these
cases; yet, on even this important point, the caselaw can be distinguished. Like the Petersen
court, the Ozment court denied the plaintiff-employee recovery on the basis of lack of foresee-
ability. Ozment v. Lance, 437 N.E.2d 930, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). In Ozment, foreseeability
was not shown because the plaintiff was a motel bus boy who was assaulted by guests that the
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student is an identifiable potential assailant, and the small number of
teachers that the student sees on a daily basis are identifiable people.
Furthermore, in Petersen, the plaintiff was precluded from recovery on
the additional ground that both the employer and the decedent were
aware of the danger. 222 In the case of the Chicago school district,
however, students with prior violent acts are currently reinstated into
the classroom without notice to teachers; as such, the danger they rep-
resent is known to the school district but unknown to the teacher.
Second, the Chicago school district should be liable for the student
assaults because it expressly agreed to protect its employees through
the UDC. In Slager, employer liability arose with the employer's ex-
press statements, actions and intent to provide for the safety of the
workers who were crossing a picket line.2 23 The employer was liable
even though both the picketers responsible for the plaintiff's injuries
and the plaintiff's own negligence could be considered as intervening
acts which could break the chain of causation.224 The jury could find
the employer liable despite the fact that there were other causes for
the plaintiff's injuries.22 5
Similar to the employer's promise in Slager, the Chicago school dis-
trict's own UDC expressly promises that teachers "[b]e free from any
physical or verbal threats while carrying out teaching and other du-
ties. '226 Furthermore, the employer in Slager was liable even though
the decedent's accident was caused by picketers who attacked his
employer had never come into contact with before. Id. In the situation between the district,
teacher, and student, the school district has an on-going relationship with the student. In fact,
that relationship puts the district in the unique position of knowledge unlike that of the em-
ployer in Ozment. By virtue of handling the student's suspension and reinstatement, the school
district-not the teacher-knows that the student is a source of danger for its employees. Fi-
nally, the Ozment court admitted that the employer-employee relationship may impose a duty
on the employer to protect the employee against the criminal acts of others, if the possibility of
some criminal act, though not necessarily the precise act, is reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 935.
222. Petersen, 641 N.E.2d at 850.
223. Slager v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 595 N.E.2d 1097, 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (reason-
ing that where the employer expressly intends to provide for the safety of employees, the lack of
a history of violence was of no significance).
224. Id.
If a party's negligence does nothing more than furnish a condition by which an injury is
made possible, and a subsequent act by a third party breaks the causal connection be-
tween the original wrong and the injury, the court may be able to determine proximate
cause as a question of law. However, the test in determining the question of proximate
cause "is whether the first wrong doer might have reasonably anticipated the interven-
ing cause as a natural and probable result of the first party's own negligence."
Id. (quoting Merlo v. Public Service Co., 45 N.E.2d 665, 675 (Ill. 1942)).
225. Id. at 1105 ("The jury is not, moreover, bound to find one sole proximate cause and
indeed, there may be more than one proximate cause for an injury.") (citing Nelson v. Union
Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1964)).
226. CHICAGO ScH. REFORM BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 149, at 8.
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
car;2 27 likewise, the school district should be liable despite the fact that
the actual assault is by a student. Finally, unlike the employer in
Slager,228 there is no basis for the school district to argue that the inju-
ries to the plaintiff are due to the teacher's negligence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Chicago school district
should be liable because it has impliedly offered its employees a safe
work environment. In Vaughn, the employer was held liable for an
attack on its employee that happened in the employer's parking lot.229
The duty to the employee arose in part from the employer's standard
operating procedures, which stated the following objective: "To main-
tain the peace and protect all employees and their property while they
are on the Company's premises. '230 The Vaughn court reasoned that
the employer's liability arose because the "defendant voluntarily un-
dertook the task of protecting its employees while on defendant's
property, including the parking lots."' 231 Quoting the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the Vaughn court added, "'Where the reliance of
the other, or of the third person, has induced him to forgo other reme-
dies or precautions against such a risk, the harm results from the negli-
gence as fully as if the actor had created the risk."' 232 The court even
noted that although there were no prior acts of physical violence at
the parking lot, the prior reports of criminal damage to property at the
lot made the attack on the decedent reasonably foreseeable. 233
The situation involving the school district, its teachers, and violent
students is much like the facts from Vaughn. In Vaughn, the employer
was put on notice because an area was open to crime;234 here, the
district is on notice that a particular student has a propensity to com-
mit violent acts. In Vaughn, the employer's own manual promised a
safe premises for work;235 the Chicago's own UDC promises that
teachers be free from physical or verbal threats. 236 Like the decedent
227. Slager, 595 N.E.2d at 1100 (attacking decedent's car and forcing decedent onto highway,
where his car was subsequently hit by a semi-trailer).
228. Id. at 1105 (arguing that decedent's own lack of prudence in driving onto highway to
escape the picketers was the proximate cause of death).
229. Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 576 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Il1. App. Ct.
1991).
230. Id. at 879. The court observed, "Plaintiff's theory was that, to perform the duty it had
undertaken by virtue of these documents, defendant was obligated to use reasonable care to
anticipate and to protect the decedent from criminal activity by third persons while the decedent
was on the defendant's parking lot." Id. at 878.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 879 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965)).
233. Id. at 881.
234. Id.
235. Vaughn, 576 N.E.2d at 879.
236. CHICAGO SCH. REFORM BD. OF TRUSTEES, supra note 149, at 8.
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in Vaughn relied on the employer's promise for a safe work prem-
ises,237 so also do teachers rely on the school district's promise to keep
them free from physical or verbal threats. This promise is even sup-
ported by the Chicago school district's actions: The metal detectors,
the security guards, and the police officers at the school all express an
intent on behalf of the school district to maintain a safe work environ-
ment for its employees. 238
3. Why a Narrow Exception to Tort Immunity Should be Provided
Penetrating tort immunity would inevitably result in large damage
verdicts for teachers assaulted by violent students who were reinstated
into the school system. Although these penalties may increase the
costs for the taxpayer over the short term, the long-term costs to the
taxpayer would decrease by developing a system of protecting teach-
ers, ultimately reducing the number of assaults on them by their
students.
In the early 1970s, tort scholars began arguing that deterrence is a
primary objective of tort law.239 The theory holds that, "[s]o long as
the defendant can anticipate bearing liability for the range of injuries
his tortious conduct foreseeably can produce, this prospect can induce
in him an appropriate deterrence response. ' 240 Such deterrence the-
ory is justified in both a negligence, fault-based system 241 and a strict
237. Vaughn, 576 N.E.2d at 878.
238. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
239. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Cor-
rective Justice, 75 TEX. L. Rav. 1801, 1803 (1997) (referring to works of Guido Calabresi and
Richard Posner). See generally GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing
the element of deterrence in accident law); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (providing an economic analysis of fault-based tort law).
240. Schwartz, supra note 239, at 1816-17; see Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews
Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 68 (1997) ("By ensuring a sufficient connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, tort law provides an economically, and morally,
coherent deterrent message: a person can anticipate being held liable for a risky activity only if
that activity actually results in a concrete harm to someone else.").
241. Molot, supra note 240, at 64.
In addition to defending this negligence standard as efficient, legal scholars have sought
to defend it as fair. Because a rational individual would accept only reasonable risks
for himself, a rational individual may only ethically impose reasonable risks upon other
persons. To expose another person to risks that we would not rationally accept for
ourselves-that is, to expose another to risks that outweigh potential rewards-is to
use that other person to our own end. It therefore seems just that the creator of an
unreasonable risk should compensate his or her victim, but that the costs of reasonable
risks can be left where they fall (i.e., on the accident victim).
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liability system.2 42
The goal here would be that the school district facing large damage
verdicts would be deterred from perpetuating a system which does
little to reduce the number of assaults on teachers. As explained in
School Crime and Violence: Victims' Rights:
The preventive aspect of third-party litigation has become one of
the more interesting and important features of this class of cases, at
least from a social point of view. The theory of tort law rests on the
view that a defendant has a duty to refrain from certain actions or to
take certain action to prevent criminal injury to the plaintiff; and, if
third-party lawsuits by crime victims are successful, then these cases
will put other potential defendants, similarly situated, on notice that
they too may be held liable. This, in turn, might stimulate potential
defendants to conduct themselves in such a manner that future vic-
timization in like cases will be prevented, or at least reduced.2 43
In short, the school district would feel compelled to take action in
order to protect its teachers, thereby reducing the number of assaults
on teachers and hence the long term cost of statutory compensation.
C. Suggestions to Protect Chicago's Teachers
In light of this discussion, this author proposes realistic guidelines
for the Chicago Board of Education and courts to follow in order to
protect teachers from the criminal acts of students. First, the Chicago
Uniform Discipline Code establishes a "zero tolerance" policy for dis-
ruptive students,2 44 but this is not happening.2 45 The rules in the UDC
need to be more strictly enforced. Students who have committed re-
peated violent acts or assaulted teachers should not be reinstated into
the school system. Simply put, "zero tolerance" should mean no
tolerance.
Second, the Chicago Board of Education needs to develop a simple
system through which teachers are notified that a student's prior sus-
pension was due to a violent act. Currently, teachers are only notified
that a student has been suspended, but they do not know what caused
that suspension. Furthermore, the law now provides that school offi-
cials must be notified when a student has been arrested for, among
242. See id. at 65 ("Given that the person who controls an activity (e.g., the manufacturer of a
product) is in the best position to minimize accident costs (i.e., is the 'cheapest cost avoider'), it
makes sense to impose the costs of accidents upon him.").
243. RAPP ET AL., supra note 24, at 37.
244. See supra Part I.D.3.
245. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. The growing number of assaults on teach-
ers, along with evidence that many students who have assaulted teachers are not expelled, sug-
gest that there is no such thing as "zero tolerance" in the Chicago public schools.
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other things, violent acts.2 46 The Chicago school district needs to use
this law so that if a student has been suspended for a violent act, the
teacher is notified.247
Third, the Illinois courts need to take an active role to protect
teachers. These courts also need to be less tolerant of unruly students
and permit teachers to recover more easily under the Illinois Workers'
Occupational Diseases Act. Finally, Illinois courts should also re-ex-
amine the policies behind the exclusivity provisions of Workers' Com-
pensation and the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. There is little excuse
for reinstating violent students into the school without notifying the
appropriate teachers. If a teacher is injured by such a student and did
not receive notification that the student could be a potential source of
danger, then the Illinois courts should be willing to pierce the school
district's immunity and permit the teacher to recover a large verdict
under common law. A jury award like the Petersen case-$2.25 mil-
lion 48-may be what is needed to compel real changes to protect
teachers in Chicago.
III. IMPACT
Initially, this Comment's goal was to offer suggestions-to both the
Chicago school district and the legal system-to solve the problem of
teachers who are exposed to students with propensities for violence.
246. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-7(A)(8) (West 1996).
247. Both the Illinois courts and the Juvenile Court Act have expressed the same policy argu-
ments for juvenile confidentiality-rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1052-
55 (I1. 1992) (holding that the juvenile victims of child abuse are clearly entitled to privacy). But
the Illinois supreme court has not stated that juvenile offenders, as opposed to juvenile victims,
are necessarily entitled to the same privacy rights:
The alarming increase in juvenile involvement in major crimes has created a more vocal
opposition to rehabilitation and a call for retribution and deterrence as an effective
technique for controlling antisocial behavior.... It is argued that publicizing the names
of juvenile offenders would deter the criminal activity by other juveniles and cause
parents to place greater controls on the behavior of their children.
Id. at 1053 (citing Diane Geraghty & Alan Raphael, Reporter's Privilege and Juvenile Anonym-
ity: Two Confidentiality Policies on a Collision Course, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 76 (1984)).
As an exception to the confidentiality provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, the reciprocal
reporting provision follows this reasoning. Its existence alone should quiet concerns about juve-
nile confidentiality. In fact, merely extending the reporting system to teachers, the safety of
whom ultimately assists in the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, would be entirely within the
spirit of the reciprocal reporting provision. Such notification can occur by placing the student's
name at the bottom of the school's daily attendance bulletin, with a brief indication as to why the
student is suspended: "assault," or "weapon's possession," or "burglary." At the very least, this
knowledge could put the teacher on notice that the student is capable of violence and the
teacher can adjust her approach to that student accordingly.
248. Petersen v. United States Reduction Co., 641 N.E.2d 845, 847 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
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Unfortunately, a few (if not all) of these suggestions will be
unpopular.
Enforcing the Chicago school district's Uniform Discipline Code
more stringently will inevitably lead to higher expulsion rates249-but
hopefully for only a brief period of time. At the outset, quicker expul-
sion appears to create more problems than it solves. 250 What, for ex-
ample, will those students do if they no longer have the opportunity to
receive an education? While this Comment offers no answer, it sug-
gests that the alternative is worse. Keeping these students in school
inevitably devalues the quality of education offered to all students.251
Chicago public school students consistently achieve at a level well be-
low their peers in other school districts throughout Illinois.252 Un-
249. See Heard, supra note 142, § 2, at 1.
250. As noted earlier, alternative school programs appear to offer a potential solution to this
problem. Yet, no one is sure where the money will come from for the alternative school solu-
tion. Moreover, the schools still expose teachers to violent students, and there is no suggestion
that these schools will do a better job of notifying teachers which students have a propensity for
violence. Banas, supra note 197, § 2, at 4.
251. Mary Hatwood Futrell, Violence in the Classroom: A Teacher's Perspective, in SCHOOLS,
VIOLENCE, AND SOCIETY 3,13 (Allan M. Hoffman ed., 1996).
Violence or the threat of violence has a direct impact on the quality of education pro-
vided and on the way teachers and students work together in the classroom. Students
are very perceptive. They may not be able to articulate their perceptions, but most of
them know whether they are receiving a good education, an education that will prepare
them to compete in the job market, college, or anywhere else....
Students frequently act out their hostility by being disruptive. This, in turn, creates
an atmosphere in the classroom and the school that militates against constructive teach-
ing and learning. For example, teachers are less apt to teach at their full potential, the
class assignments are less creative and challenging, and the ethos in the school is less
motivating if tension constantly permeates the environment. In addition, teachers, like
students, are less eager to go to school every day. Thus, students in these schools are
much more likely ... to be taught by a "revolving door" of substitutes.
Id.; see JOHN DEVINE, MAXIMUM SECURITY: THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY
SCHOOLS 23-24 (1996) (defining "lower tier" schools as schools with low achievement levels,
poor attendance and high rates of assaults and gun possession); Alfred M. Bloch & Ruth Rein-
hardt Bloch, Teachers-A New Endangered Species?, in VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN THE SCHOOLS
81-89 (Keith Baker & Robert J. Rubel eds., 1990) (arguing that consequences of growing vio-
lence in American schools includes teacher fear, disillusionment, and ineffectiveness).
252. Based on the results of statewide standardized tests, the Chicago public schools "made
some scattered gains in the test scores, but overall, student achievement remained low or de-
clined. About 75 percent of Chicago's students scored below the national norms in reading and
math." Patricia Tennison, Northwest Suburban Schools Take Some Seats Upfront on Tests, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 15, 1994, at 1. In fact, 42% of Chicago public school students had scores that put
them in the bottom quarter of all students taking the reading tests, and 47% were in the bottom
quarter of all the math scores. Michael Briggs, Report Finds No Letup in Big-City School
Problems, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 22.
In the first-ever comparison of the nation's largest school systems-during the school year
1990-91-Chicago had the highest dropout rate and the lowest test scores. Maribeth Vander
Weele, Failing Grades for City Schools: Chicago Rated as Worst on Dropouts, Test Scores, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at 1. Chicago's drop out rate was nearly 46% in 1990. Id.
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doubtedly, one of the contributing factors to this low achievement is
the disrupted classroom created by the violent student.253 One would
hope that by expelling the students whose consistent violence deval-
ues the education for all students, the quality of education would
eventually rise for the vast majority of nonviolent Chicago public
school students. As public education changes from a right to a privi-
lege, perhaps students would start treating it as such and take learning
more seriously.
Second, teachers should be notified when the school district has
knowledge of a student's propensity for violence. This is yet another
suggestion that will meet much resistance: Juveniles are, after all, pro-
tected with a number of privacy rights.254 Besides, it is hard to say
how a teacher would treat a student once she knows that student has a
propensity for violence. But while there is an inevitable risk that the
quality of the student's education may be affected, at the very least a
system of notification would let teachers know which students are
prone to (in the students' own vernacular) "snap."
The impact of the third suggestion would obviously provide teach-
ers with financial recovery (through the Illinois Workers' Occupa-
tional Diseases Act) for psychological harm induced by unruly
students. This is compensation which would normally not be available
to a teacher through workers' compensation because of the absence of
a physical injury. The increased costs to the taxpayer would serve as
impetus for the Chicago school district to expel violent students more
readily and develop a system of notifying teachers of the students
which have a propensity for violence.
Finally, and most importantly, the final suggestion means that some
teachers may obtain large damage verdicts from the school district.
Eventually these costs would be borne by the taxpayer. The increased
short-term costs, however, would inevitably lead to a more cautious
school district that is more willing to expel violent students and de-
velop a system of notifying teachers.2 55 Both actions would have the
result of lowering the alarmingly high number of assaults on teach-
ers.256 This, in turn, would lead to a long-term savings by fewer claims
253. A lack of money is the popular scapegoat for the poor performance of Chicago's schools,
as the more affluent suburban school systems traditionally have more money for per-pupil ex-
penditures. Tennison, supra note 252. During the school year 1993-94, however, while the aver-
age cost per pupil at the high school level was $5,579 statewide, Chicago spent $6,596 per pupil.
Id. This obviously suggests that perhaps other factors-besides a lack of funding-are affecting
student achievement in Chicago.
254. See supra note 247.
255. See supra Part II.B.3.
256. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
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filed under the Workers' Compensation Act and the Illinois Workers'
Occupational Diseases Act. As an added bonus, perhaps the number
of incidents involving violent students would drop, helping to restore
much-needed order to a chaotic and under-achieving school system.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is obviously too late to help Mrs. Smith. Nothing can be done to
take back what Thomas did to her in their writing workshop at Sum-
ner Elementary School on February 7, 1997.
But if Mrs. Smith's story offers anything, it should shed light on a
growing problem in our urban schools today. Teachers are being
asked to go forth blindly and teach the masses. The masses appear to
be growing more aggressive and violent.
This Comment has tried to take a cue from Mrs. Smith and, once
again, draw attention to a large problem. Some of its suggestions will
undoubtedly be unpopular to many-probably even to Mrs. Smith.
Yet, they are offered with the hope that the discussion about the prob-
lem continues so that a solution can eventually be found.
Noel M. Johnston*
* Noel M. Johnston taught English at Jones Metropolitan High School in Chicago from 1992-
1998.
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